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ABSTRACT
An adversarial query is an image that has been modified to dis-
rupt content-based image retrieval (CBIR), while appearing nearly
untouched to the human eye. This paper presents an analysis of
adversarial queries for CBIR based on neural, local, and global
features. We introduce an innovative neural image perturbation
approach, called Perturbations for Image Retrieval Error (PIRE),
that is capable of blocking neural-feature-based CBIR. PIRE differs
significantly from existing approaches that create images adversar-
ial with respect to CNN classifiers because it is unsupervised, i.e., it
needs no labeled data from the data set to which it is applied. Our
experimental analysis demonstrates the surprising effectiveness of
PIRE in blocking CBIR, and also covers aspects of PIRE that must
be taken into account in practical settings, including saving images,
image quality and leaking adversarial queries into the background
collection. Our experiments also compare PIRE (a neural approach)
with existing keypoint removal and injection approaches (which
modify local features). Finally, we discuss the challenges that face
multimedia researchers in the future study of adversarial queries.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, researchers working on deep learning for image classifi-
cation have started to study adversarial images intensively and to
develop techniques to create them [37] [12] [24] [2] [23] [25]. Their
work defines an adversarial example to be an image that a human
can easily interpret, but that a CNN-based classifier assigns to an
unexpected class. Typically, adversarial examples are created by
taking an image that is correctly classified by a classifier, and per-
turbing the pixels. The perturbations are small, such that humans
can look at the modified image and judge it to be nearly untouched.
The perturbations are also carefully chosen, such that the modified
image is no longer classified correctly, but rather is moved over
the decision boundary of the classifier and is classified incorrectly.
Generally, an image set labeled with the target classes is used to
train the perturbations.
In this paper, we extend the idea of adversarial examples from
image classification to content-based image retrieval (CBIR). We
define an adversarial query as an image that a human can easily
interpret, but that causes a CBIR system unexpected difficulties. The
principle is illustrated by the example in Figure 1. The adversarial
query resembles the original image as closely as possible.1
1Our code is available at https://github.com/liuzrcc/PIRE
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Figure 1: A successful query image (top left) and the corre-
sponding adversarial query (top right). The two are visually
nearly identical to the human eye. A CBIR system ranks rel-
evant results high for the original image query and low for
the adversarial query.
The fundamental difference between creating adversarial exam-
ples in the case of image classification and creating adversarial
queries in the case of CBIR is the information available for guid-
ing the image modifications. In contrast to classification systems,
which assume a set of discrete classes, CBIR systems are designed to
handle arbitrary queries and unconstrained background collections.
Specifically, in the deep learning image classification scenario, ad-
versarial modifications are informed by class boundaries. Decision
boundary information is lacking in the CBIR scenario. As such, in
the CBIR scenario, there is no obvious direction, or directions, in
which to move an image in pixel space in order to create a query
that is adversarial with respect to the CBIR system. In order to ad-
dress this challenge, we propose an approach called Perturbations
for Image Retrieval Error (PIRE).
PIRE is able to generate perturbations without needing guid-
ing information (i.e., PIRE requires no class labels, or relevance
judgments from the data set to which it is applied). PIRE perturbs
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images such that they can still be interpreted to the human eye, but
that they no longer can be used as successful queries for CBIR.
In sum, this paper makes the following contributions: (1) We
explain why it is important to study adversarial queries. (2) We
present PIRE, our neural perturbation approach to creating ad-
versarial queries, and experimentally demonstrate its impact on
different CBIR systems (i.e., systems using neural, local, and global
features). (3) We discuss and analyze practical aspects of adversarial
queries. The paper is organized as follows: after introducing the im-
portance of adversarial queries in Section 2, we present the relevant
related work in Section 3. Section 4 describes the framework in
which we carry out our experiments. Then, Sections 5 and 6 present
our experiments and analyses. Finally, Section 7 pulls everything
together, and provides an outlook on future work.
2 WHY STUDY ADVERSARIAL QUERIES?
The study of adversarial image examples is motivated by specific
threat models. Informally defined, a threat model expresses what we
should be worried about, i.e., the dangers that a specific system or
technology must be able to ward off. Adversarial image queries play
a role in widely different threat models, which are described in this
section. Section 2.1 looks at adversarial queries as being dangerous.
From this perspective, the practical application of our research is
understanding attacks on CBIR systems in order to defend against
them. Section 2.2 looks at adversarial queries as being protective.
From this perspective, the practical application of our research is
preventing, or at least disincentivizing, harmful use of CBIR.
2.1 Threat of image modification technology
The assumption behind many widely-adopted threat models is that
modified images are a source of danger. Here, we discuss three fa-
miliar examples of such threat models. First, researchers working on
image classification are generally worried about scenarios in which
modified images cause misclassification. This threat model applies,
for example, to scenarios in which computer vision technology is
used by self-driving cars [9]. Adversarial image queries are relevant
to such threat models since memory-based image classifiers are
generally based on CBIR systems. Second, researchers working on
keypoint removal and injection are generally worried about scenar-
ios in which modified images cause the identification of duplicate or
near-duplicate images to be blocked. Such work, e.g., [8], [7] and [6],
is carried out in the use scenario of preventing copyright violation
and image forgery via copy-move. Third, researchers working on
image forensics also care about the post-processing operations,
such as resampling [31], double JPEG compression [10] and de-
noising [17], since they are of interest in a forensic examination
of an image and can affect forensic methods in various ways [17].
If we consider these threat models, then our reason for studying
adversarial queries is to understand how modified images can harm
image matching systems.
2.2 Threat of image retrieval technology
The assumption behind another more recently emerging class of
threat models is that the multimedia retrieval system itself is a
source of danger. These retrieval-specific threat models are com-
monly adopted by researchers working on multimedia privacy.
The specific threat is a privacy violation, specifically, harm that
people suffer caused by malicious actors who misuse an existing
retrieval system (for example an online image search engine) or
who build their own retrieval system to search in a collection of
misappropriated images. This danger was first articulated by [11],
who described the threat of ‘cybercasing’: criminals using online
search engines to mine the Web for users whose online sharing
behavior reveals that they own valuable items, and when they are
away on vacation. The concern has been recently grown stronger
because of high profile data breaches, e.g., [34], which have made
clear that sharing images in ‘private’ mode is not a perfect solution
for protection. Unscrupulous actors can implement their own CBIR
system if they can get their hands on enough data. The interest-
ing and surprising aspect of retrieval-specific threat models is that
giving people access to image modification technology actually
would help them to protect themselves against those seeking to
misuse their images. Instead of a danger, image modification is a
form of protection. If we consider retrieval-specific threat models,
then our reason for studying adversarial queries is to understand
the conditions under which the matching ability of CBIR systems
can be blocked.
A recent investigation concerned with the threat of cybercas-
ing [4] examines the potential of image enhancements to block the
inference of the geo-location of the photos that users take and post
online. Our work differs from [4] in that we focus specifically on
CBIR and we consider image queries that are explicitly designed
to be adversarial. However, we adopt the same threat model, and
we focus our investigation on a CBIR problem that is related to
location because it involves images of buildings in cities.
3 RELATEDWORK
We first cover work on neural adversarial examples for image clas-
sification and then work on blocking local-feature-based CBIR.
3.1 Adversarial examples and classification
Research on adversarial examples in the deep learning commu-
nity was launched by [37], who demonstrated the possibility of
constructing images adversarial with respect to a convolutional
neural network image classifier (which we will refer to as the ’CNN-
model’). As mentioned in the introduction, the basic mechanism
used to create adversarial examples is to perturb pixels to construct a
misclassified image while at the same time minimizing the distance
between the original image (input image) and adversarial image.
Work on adversarial examples started with ‘whitebox’ approaches,
which have full knowledge of the CNN-model that they are attempt-
ing to delude. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [12] makes
use of the gradient of the model with respect to the input image.
It increases the model’s loss on the input image given the correct
class label by perturbing it in the ascending direction of the gradi-
ent. DeepFool [24] extends FGSM with more precise control over
the size of the perturbations. For both FGSM and DeepFool, the
perturbations are specific to the input image, and the correct class
label of that image is known. Comparatively, PIRE only operates on
neural features without accessing any ground truth (e.g., relevance
judgements) of the CBIR system.
Subsequently, researchers have worked to extend ‘whitebox’
methods so that they require less information about the input im-
ages and less information about the CNN-model. Universal Adver-
sarial Perturbations (UAP) [23] took a first step in this direction.
UAP produces perturbations that do not require prior knowledge of
the input images, however it does need a labeled training set. UAP
adversarial examples have been shown to have an adversarial effect
on CNN-models other than the one originally used to generate the
perturbations. The ‘universal’ in UAP means that the perturbations
are generated to be effective for a majority of images, although in
practice they fail for a subset of images. Another whitebox method
that is universal in this respect is Fast Feature Fool (FFF) [25], which
generates adversarial images by calculating the maximal spurious
activations in each convolutional layer while constraining the size
of perturbations. FFF, like UAP, produces perturbations without
knowledge of the images to be modified. However, whereas UAP
requires training data, FFF can make use of the CNN-model with
no additional training needed.
Currently, ‘blackbox’ techniques, which can create images ad-
versarial to an arbitrary CNN-model remain elusive. Attempts at
‘blackbox’ solutions leverage existing ‘whitebox’ solutions. An en-
semble method has been proposed, which creates examples that are
adversarial with respect to a number of known CNN-models, and
then tests them against a blackbox model [21]. Also, reconstruction
methods have been proposed, namely [28] and [27], which probe
the blackbox model with test examples, and then train substitute
models that mimic the real model.
In our work, we focus on the case where we have access to the
trained CNN-model used by the CBIR system at the moment at
which we create our adversarial queries. However, we point out
that our approach is not a completely ‘whitebox’ approach. Labeled
training data is used to pre-train and fine-tune the CNN-model,
but PIRE is ultimately applied to images from a third semantically
related, but yet completely unseen, data set. For this reason, we refer
to our approach as unsupervised, and not requiring class labels.
3.2 Keypoint Removal and Injection (KR&I)
In order to provide a complete picture of the behavior of adversarial
queries, we consider not only neural features, but also local features.
We focus on SIFT-based methods because they are representative of
local-feature-based CBIR and also due to the rich literature on SIFT
KR&I. The first work to consider influences of KR&I in SIFT-based
CBIR systems was [8], [7] and [6]. Here, blocking CBIR means
blocking the retrieval of exact duplicate or near duplicate images.
In contrast, we are interested in blocking the retrieval of images
containing the same subject matter as the query, without a specific
focus on matching duplicates or near duplicates.
Other KR&I work is not directly connected to CBIR, but focuses
on image forensics and multimedia security. With security issues in
mind, [13] proposed to modify SIFT features while simultaneously
keeping image quality. Later the authors proposed an optimization-
based approach [22]. Combiningmultiple techniques, Classification-
based Attack (CLBA) [5] proposed to use an iterative procedure
to apply different methods on keypoints in different classes. [20]
proposed SIFT keypoint removal and injection methods which re-
move keypoints with minimized distortion on the processed image.
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Figure 2: Our experimental analysis tests combinations
of query modifications (Top) and CBIR systems (bottom).
Blue boxes are neural-representation approaches and green
boxes are local-feature approaches.
Recently, [19] proposed Removal via Directed Graph Construction
(RDG) method to remove SIFT keypoints for colour images while
maintaining high visual quality.
4 EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK
Figure 2 depicts the framework in which we carry out our exper-
imental analysis. Our experiments test different combinations of
image modification approach and CBIR system. The top of the fig-
ure shows the query modification step, which either uses PIRE or
KR&I. The bottom of the figure shows the image retrieval step,
which uses a CBIR system based on either neural, local, or global
features. In this section, we describe the design choices that we use
for implementing the framework, before introducing PIRE in detail.
4.1 Content-based Image Retrieval Systems
A CBIR system accepts an image as a query and returns a list of
relevant images as a result. The images are drawn from a larger
collection, which we refer to as the background collection. In a
basic CBIR system, such as the one we adopt here, ranking occurs
by comparing the vector representing the query image with the
vectors representing each of the images in the background collec-
tion. The results list consists of the images from the background
collection ranked in order of closeness to the query. CBIR systems
are differentiated by the features that they use to create the image
feature vectors. As previously mentioned, in our experiments we
use neural, local, and global features. We describe each in turn.
Neural representations are compact representations that are
extracted from an image using a pre-trained, and possibly then
also fine-tuned, CNN-model. For our experiments, we need the
currently best available neural representations, and for this reason
we adopt GeM [32]. GeM is a fully convolutional CNN-model with
a Generalized-Mean pooling layer. Using GeM as a feature extractor
achieves the current state of the art on the data sets that we will
use for our experiments, Oxford5k [29] and Paris6k [30], which are
described in more detail below. We chose to use the structure of
ResNet-101. GeM discards the fully-connected layer and replaces
the average pooling layer of ResNet-101 with a Generalized-Mean
pooling layer. The model is pre-trained on ImageNet and fine-tuned
using a data set that consists of 120k Flickr images provided in [32]
following a structure-from-motion (SfM) pipeline. The fine-tuning
data set is a subset the data set of [33], which contains 7.4 million
images from Flickrwith keywords of landmarks, cities and countries
across the world. The subset excludes Oxford and Paris.
GeM has been shown to outperform previous state-of-the-art ap-
proaches, whichwemention here briefly for completeness. First, [35]
used off-the-shelf neural networks. To improve retrieval perfor-
mance, Neural Codes [1] used a fine-tuned CNN-model for neural
feature extraction. Finally, [38] proposed regional maximum activa-
tion of convolutions (R-MAC) to improve image retrieval by adding
an additional pooling layer to CNN-model.
The representations that are used by local-feature-based CBIR
systems are generally Bag-of-Visual-Word (BoVW) models, dating
back to [36]. Codebooks containing a certain number of visual
words are trained on extracted SIFT features. We adopt a classic
BoVWmodel with Hamming Embedding (HE) [14], which provides
binary signatures that refine the visual-word-based matching. Fol-
lowing [14], we extract SIFT feature of images and train codebooks
of size 20,000. Binary signatures of length 64 are used in the HE
setting, and the threshold is set to 24. Note that the basic BoVW
system that we adopt performs competitively with approaches such
as VLAD in [15]. For this reason, we are confident that it meets the
needs of the experiments we perform here. We save more detailed
investigation of techniques such as geometric matching and query
expansion for future work.
The representations used by a global-feature-based CBIR sys-
tem capture information about overall image texture and image
color, rather than information about specific keypoints. Color his-
tograms and Edge histograms (MPEG-7 descriptors) are commonly
used for extracting global features. For our experiments we adopt
two widely-used global feature representations: Color and Edge
Directivity Descriptor (CEDD) [3], which combines image color
and texture information, and GIST [26], which extracts a holistic
image representation reflecting the shape of a scene.
We perform experiments with two types of image queries: whole
image queries (designated WI) and bounding box queries (desig-
nated BB). The BB queries use only the content of a bounding box
that focuses on the main subject matter of the image. This bounding
box is pre-defined (it is included with the queries in the data sets).
We use BB queries in order to make our work comparable to other
papers who test on the same data sets.
To evaluate, we compare the quality of the results list returned
using the original image as a query with the results list returned by
adversarial query (i.e., the modified image). We adopt mean average
precision (mAP), a standard information retrieval evaluation metric,
to measure results list quality. An image modification approach is
successful if we observe a decrease in mAP when we move from
the original query to the modified query. Finally, to evaluate visual
quality, we use structural similarity (SSIM) [39], which assesses the
degradation of structural information to be presumed related to the
human-perceived quality.
4.2 Data
Weperform our experiments on two data sets: Oxford5k and Paris6k,
which are publicly available and widely used in CBIR research.
Because so much work has been done on these data sets, what
constitutes state-of-the-art performance is well understood, and we
can be certain that when we test the blocking effects of adversarial
queries on CBIR, we are testing a strong CBIR system. The Oxford5k
data set consists of 5063 images and includes 55 standard queries
representing different views/parts of 11 Oxford buildings. Paris6k
data set consists of 6412 images and also includes 55 standard
queries from 11 different Paris landmarks. Both data sets include
distractor images, which are not related to any of the queries in the
data set.
5 NEURAL-FEATURE-BASED CBIR
In this section, we propose a simple yet effective algorithm, Per-
turbations for Image Retrieval Error (PIRE), which blocks neural-
feature-based CBIR by perturbing pixels of the image query.
5.1 Adversarial Queries with PIRE
The basic innovation of PIRE is to modify the original image by
pushing its feature representation away from the original position
in feature space. Specifically, PIRE maximizes the distance between
the feature representation of the original image and that of the
modified image, while at the same time limiting the overall size of
the permutation. Recall that PIRE is designed with the assumption
that the CNN-model (GeM [32] in this paper) is available, and it
aims to modify the input image with perturbations that are barely
perceptible to the human eye.
PIRE is presented in Algorithm 1. x represents the image query,
andv represents the perturbation vector. We start with a random
perturbation feature vector that has the same size of the image and
update it by optimizing the following objective function:
maximize ∥ f (x) − f (x +v)∥22 (1)
subject to ∥v ∥∞ ≤ ϵ
This optimization process will stop when the iterative conditions
are met. We create the final perturbation using a multiplicative fac-
tor, here, set to 10, to guarantee that the perturbations are retained
when the image is saved in an 8-bit format. We return to address
this factor in more detail in Section 5.2.1.
In each iteration, the perturbation vector is updated using the
Adam optimization algorithm [16]. In our experiments we look at
the impact of T, the number of rounds iterated. When the itera-
tive conditions are met, perturbation vector vi is the calculated
perturbation vector.
In order to test PIRE, we apply it to all the query images of our
data sets to create adversarial images, which are then saved. Table 1
reports results for the original queries and for adversarial queries
created with PIRE (T = 500). It can be seen that the mAP drops
dramatically, indicating that PIRE is highly successful. Note that
here we report bounding box (BB) queries only, and we are not
yet concerned with the visual appearance of queries. As we will
in Section 5.2, the choice of T allows us to control the trade off
between PIRE’s adversarial effect and its visual impact.
Algorithm 1: Perturbations for Image Retrieval Error (PIRE)
Input : Image query x ; Neural feature function f ; Iteration
limit T ; Perturbation vector range ϵ ;
Output :Adversarial image query x + 10 ∗vi ;
1 w,h = size(x1);
2 i = 1;
3 Generate a random matrixv0(w×h) ;
4 while i < T do
5 Calculate the distance between original image x and
perturbed image x +vi−1;
vi = argmax
v
∥(f (x) − f (x +vi−1))∥22 ;
6 Projectvi into a L∞ norm sphere;
vi = clip(vi ,−ϵ, ϵ);
7 i = i + 1;
8 end
9 Return perturbed image query;
return x + 10 ∗vi ;
Table 1: Performance (mAP) of neural-feature-based CBIR
(GeM [32]) on Oxford5k and Paris6k data sets before and af-
ter original PIRE (10 ∗v) modification with T=500 iterations.
Oxford5k
(BB)
Paris6k
(BB)
Original 78.39 87.27
PIRE (T = 500) 5.51 9.34
5.2 Adversarial Queries in Practice
5.2.1 Saving queries. In order for PIRE to be used in practice, it is
necessary that adversarial queries remain adversarial when they are
saved. When saving an image in JPEG format (uint8), float values
that do not fit into 8 bits are approximated. This means that the
perturbations that PIRE adds to an image should not be so small that
they disappear when the image is saved. In [2], a method based on
greed search was proposed to avoid the rounding effects discussed
above. Saving images is obviously important, and so in Algorithm 1,
on the last line, we use a multiplicative factor 10 in order to make
sure that our perturbations survive rounding.
However, this approach of blindly making perturbations large is
not elegant, since large perturbations lead to artifacts that are visu-
ally obvious. To tackle this issue, we propose a refinement to PIRE.
The refinement adds a function p(vi ) that magnifies the original
perturbation vector to be just large enough not to be rounded away
when the image is saved. These controlled perturbations improve
the visual appearance of the adversarial queries. As the final step,
the refined PIRE algorithm returns xq +p(vi ) as the modified image
query. Exploratory experiments allowed us to observe that refined
PIRE is able to substantially reduce the amount of perturbation
needed to achieve an adversarial effect, and, as will be discussed
below, also improves the visual appearance. We point out that the
example in Figure 1 is an actual query from the Oxford5k data set
tested with respect to our neural-feature-based CBIR system. The
Table 2: Performance (mAP) of neural-feature-based CBIR
(GeM [32]) on Oxford5k and Paris6k data sets before and af-
ter query modification by PIRE (p(v)) (T=200 and T=500).
Oxford5k
(BB / WI)
Paris6k
(BB / WI)
Original 78.39/74.42 87.27/87.26
PIRE (T = 200) 22.98/18.00 34.49/26.53
PIRE (T = 500) 3.93/2.31 10.53/7.18
original query image achieves an AP of 93.95 and for the adversarial
query (created with refined PIRE T=500) the AP plunges to 3.77.
The PIRE results in the rest of the paper are for refined PIRE.
5.2.2 Viewing queries. Next, we focus on the experience of users
viewing adversarial queries. In order to get further insight into the
visual impact of PIRE perturbations, we experimented with different
levels of perturbation. Specifically, we prepared adversarial image
queries with refined PIRE for two different representative values of
the threshold T, which controls the number of iterations used to
calculate the perturbations. Table 2 shows that adversarial image
query generated with fewer rounds (T=200) still strongly decreases
the performance of neural-feature-based CBIR.
In Figure 3, we present example queries to illustrate the contrast
between PIRE using different values of the threshold on the number
of iterations (T=200 and T=500). In order to quantify the relative
Original PIRE (T=200) PIRE (T=500)
AP = 99.99 AP = 77.31 AP = 2.96
Figure 3: Examples of original image queries vs. adversarial
queries generated using PIRE with different number of iter-
ations (T=200 andT=500). Fewer iterations lead to less visible
perturbations. (Best viewed on screen with magnification.)
difference in impact on the visual appearance, we report SSIM
values in Table 3. Although more iterations lower the SSIM, the
quality is still acceptable at both levels. In addition, we compared
the SSIM value of the original PIRE (10 ∗ v) and the refined PIRE
(p(v)). SSIM on BB queries from Oxford5k (T = 200) went from
0.757 (PIRE) to 0.801 (refined PIRE). For BB queries on Paris6k (T =
200) results went from 0.690 (PIRE) to 0.771 (refined PIRE).
5.2.3 Protecting queries. Next, we demonstrate that PIRE has po-
tential to cause a drop in the mAP of a CBIR system when the
neural network used for indexing is unknown. We used a new
neural network architecture, VGG-GeM, as the basis for generat-
ing adversarial queries with PIRE. We tested these queries against
our original neural-feature-based CBIR system, which uses ResNet-
GeM. We observed a mAP drop from 74.42 to 2.91 (Oxford5k), and
from 87.26 to 9.39 (Paris6k) (T=500; cf. Table 2). We note that when
VGG-GeM is used for both PIRE and retrieval, the effect is compa-
rable to when ResNet-GeM is used for both PIRE and retrieval. We
Table 3: Average image quality (SSIM values) of adversarial
queries from Oxford5k and Paris6K data sets generated by
PIRE. (The SSIM value of the original query equals 1; BB=
Bounding Box and WI=Whole Image.)
Oxford5k
(BB / WI)
Paris6k
(BB / WI)
PIRE (T=200) 0.801/0.754 0.793/0.771
PIRE (T=500) 0.738/0.687 0.727/0.716
Table 4: Performance (mAP) of neural-feature-based CBIR
(GeM [32]) on the Oxford5k data set with bounding box
queries and different resizing/cropping settings. Original
image queries are compared with PIRE adversarial queries.
Resizing 50% 80% 100% 150% 200%
Original 65.09 74.31 78.39 71.30 62.03
PIRE (T = 500) 55.91 41.41 3.93 16.08 12.06
Cropping 100% 90% 80% 60% 40%
Original 78.39 76.01 76.01 69.54 46.89
PIRE (T = 500) 3.93 24.13 27.26 25.81 10.35
do not investigate VGG-GeM in more detail here, since the SSIM
is ca. 0.15 lower for PIRE queries created with VGG-GeM than for
PIRE queries created with ResNet-GeM. Our conclusion here is that
PIRE has the potential to lower mAP without access to information
on the architecture used for indexing. This conclusion is consistent
with a further set of exploratory CBIR experiments we carried out
with Google Images (https://images.google.com). The details of this
system are unknown to us, but we assume that advanced neural
representations are used, and that the background collection (in-
dex) is very large. We found the existence of a unexpectedly high
number of cases in which the results returned by Google Images
are impacted by PIRE. Future work on the investigation of nature
of this impact promises to yield further interesting insight.
5.2.4 EditingQueries. Simple image transformations, such as resiz-
ing and cropping, may destroy the specific structure of adversarial
perturbations. This effect was pointed out by [40] for image classi-
fication. Here, we use the Oxford5k data set to test the robustness
of the perturbations generated by our PIRE against resizing and
cropping of the adversarial query. These transformations obviously
will also affect the performance of the original queries, so we report
results for those as well.
For image resizing, we implement upscaling and downscaling
operations, resulting in resized image queries with 200%, 150%, 80%
and 50% of the original size. From the results, which are reported in
Table 4, it can be observed that upscaling has only a small influence
on PIRE (i.e., PIRE mAP remains lower than original mAP), while
downscaling has larger influence (i.e., PIRE mAP and original mAP
are closer). We suspect that the effect of adversarial queries lies in
the subtle perturbation of the original pixels, downscaling changes
most of the perturbed pixels. On the other hand, upscaling only
Table 5: Impact of PIRE on the performance (AP) of neural-
feature-based CBIR (GeM [32]) for two specific queries
before and after replacing the relevant images for these
queries in the background collection.
Background Query christ-church-4 triomphe-3
Original Original 93.88 89.52
Original PIRE (T=200) 2.83 7.39
Replaced PIRE (T=200) 34.52 48.85
Replaced PIRE (T=500) 22.43 36.42
interpolates new pixels between the perturbed pixels and for this
reason does not impact the structure of perturbation as strongly.
For image cropping, we apply four different settings, i.e., 40%,
60%, 80% and 90% of the original size. From the results, which are
also reported in Table 4, we can observe that image cropping has
more impact than resizing on the original performance of CBIR,
which we attribute to the loss of image content. However, PIRE
remains effective, and causes substantial performance drops in
different settings of image cropping.
5.2.5 Leaking queries. If PIRE is used in practice, it can be expected
that some images that have been perturbed with PIRE find their way
(i.e., “leak") into the background collection. We use one query from
each of our data sets (christ-church-4 for Oxford5k and triomphe-3
for Paris6k) to explore what happens when not only queries, but
also background images are perturbed with PIRE. For each query,
we replace all its original relevant images (i.e., the ones labeled good
or ok) in the background collection with adversarial versions using
PIRE (T=200). We test two cases: one in which the image queries
are perturbed with exactly the same setting of PIRE (T=200), and
one in which they are perturbed with a different setting (T=500).
The results, reported in Table 5, demonstrate that adversarial
queries can still maintain an adversarial effect when the relevant
background images have been perturbed. If the relevant background
images are perturbed with a different T than the adversarial query,
the adversarial effect is stronger (mAP is lower) than when they are
perturbed with the same T. These results suggest that adversarial
queries leaking into the background collection might diminish,
but will not negate, the adversarial effect over time. An approach
to maintaining the strength of the adversarial effect would be to
promote the use of diverse perturbation settings.
6 CBIR BEYOND NEURAL FEATURES
In order to understand the larger implications of adversarial queries,
we now turn to look at local and global image features.
6.1 Local-feature-based CBIR
Here, we test PIRE against the SIFT-based CBIR system introduced
in Section 4.1, and compare it to existing KR&I-modifications that
have been developed to block retrieval with local features.
6.1.1 KR&I-modification. We use the central methods from pre-
vious work to remove and inject SIFT keypoints. From [7], we
test Removal with Minimum local Distortion (RMD) and Local
Smoothing (LS), as well as the Forge new keypoints with Minimum
local Distortion (FMD) method, which is representative of keypoint
LS + FMD
Oxford5k Paris6k
Color 
Recovered
Original
Figure 4: Examples of SIFT KR&I: original image queries
with specific-region enlargements (top row), gray-scale im-
ages modified with LS + FMD (middle row), and the color
recovered version of the modified images (bottom row).
Table 6: Performance (mAP) of SIFT-based CBIR on Ox-
ford5k and Paris6k data sets: original queries and after
modification with KR&I and PIRE. (BB=Bounding Box and
WI=Whole Image.)
Oxford5k
(BB / WI)
Paris6k
(BB / WI)
Original 52.57/51.59 45.46/44.63
RDG 53.00/51.08 44.45/44.44
RMD 53.81/53.02 44.47/45.23
RMD + LS 42.54/46.90 32.75/33.60
FMD 54.20/51.77 42.38/44.58
LS + FMD 41.23/42.21 29.86/32.64
PIRE (T = 500) 40.90/44.05 39.23/40.73
injection. In addition, we also test Removal via Directed Graph
Construction (RDG) [19], a SIFT keypoint removal method that
explicitly addresses visual quality.
We carry out experiments with SIFT-based CBIR on the original
queries, on queries modified with five different KR&I methods, and
on adversarial queries created with PIRE. Results are presented
in Table 6. Only two KR&I methods (RMD + LS and LS + FMD)
achieve substantial success in lowering the mAP compared to the
mAP of the original queries, and some increase it (by unintention-
ally streamlining the visual word vocabulary). Interestingly, PIRE
(T=500), although it is designed to be adversarial with respect to
neural-feature-based CBIR, shows a blocking effect with respect
to SIFT-based CBIR. For the Oxford5k data set, this effect is on par
with the best of KR&I methods. We point out that KR&I methods
maintain a better image quality than PIRE, as can be seen from
Table 7, which reports SSIM for RMD + LS and LS + FMD.
6.1.2 SIFT color recovery. Since, essentially, SIFT features are ex-
tracted from single-channel images, in general, KR&I-modifications
can only be applied to gray-scale images. However, because we are
interested in visual appearance, we would like to compare color
versions of KR&I-modified images. To this end, we propose a naive
Table 7: Average image quality (SSIM values) of adversarial
queries from Oxford5k and Paris6K data sets generated by
KR&Imethods. (The SSIM value of the original query equals
1; BB= Bounding Box and WI=Whole Image.)
Oxford5k
(BB / WI)
Paris6k
(BB / WI)
LS + FMD 0.917/0.938 0.953/0.971
RMD + LS 0.915/0.940 0.952/0.972
method to recover color after KR&I modification. Color recovery
also allows us tomake a fair comparison between the impact of PIRE
and KR&I modification on global-feature-based CBIR in Section 6.2.
Given an original color image I rдb with three channels I r ,Iд
and Ib , its gray-scale version Iдray can be calculated by the widely-
used formula Iдray = 0.30 ∗ I r + 0.59 ∗ Iд + 0.11 ∗ Ib . A successful
recovery method should guarantee that the restored color image
Iˆ rдb can be transformed back to the modified gray-scale image
Imod without the loss of modification effects, i.e., Imod = 0.30 ∗
Iˆ r + 0.59 ∗ Iˆд + 0.11 ∗ Iˆb . In order to recover the color information,
we multiply the pixel at each location (i,j) by the same ratio α for
the three channels of the original image I rдb . The process can be
formalized as
α (i, j) = Imod(i, j)/Igray(i, j)
{Iˆc (i, j)|c ∈ {r ,д,b}} = α (i, j) ∗ {Ic (i, j)|c ∈ {r ,д,b}}
Figure 4 provides a impression of the image quality after mod-
ification with LS + FMD, using two example queries. For each
example, details in the red square are enlarged and shown along-
side the whole image query. Our simple color recovery method
appears to achieve its aim well. We can observe that artifacts are
present in the gray-scale modified images. These are echoed in the
color-recovered images.
6.2 Global-Feature-based CBIR
Finally, we turn to investigating global-feature-based CBIR, using
the CEDD and GIST systems described in Section 4.1. CEDD is a
low computational-cost feature that incorporates color and texture
information in a histogram, while GIST features can represent per-
ceptual dimensions (naturalness, openness, roughness, expansion
and ruggedness) of a semantic scene by encoding coarsely localized
information in the energy spectrum of an image [19].
The results in Table 8 reveal that image modifications operating
on local features (LS + FMD) do not block global-feature-based
CBIR. However, our PIRE adversarial queries have a quite strong
blocking effect on CEDD-based CBIR and a quite noticeable block-
ing effect on GIST-based CBIR. These results are interesting since
PIRE was not trained to block global-feature-based retrieval. In or-
der to understand their implications, we must know whether PIRE
is acting specifically to disrupt pixel patterns that are important for
global-feature-based CBIR, or it is merely acting as a sophisticated
method of introducing noise throughout the image, which then
has a blocking effect because it makes the overall image quality
worse. To this end, we carry out a baseline experiment using queries
modified with Gaussian noise. Specifically, we generate noise for
Table 8: Performance (mAP) of global-feature-based CBIR
(Whole image queries): original queries, PIRE (T=500), KR&I
modification, and Gaussian noise baseline.
Oxford5k
(CEDD / GIST)
Paris6k
(CEDD / GIST)
Original 10.77/19.29 9.61/18.30
LS+FMD 10.67/18.58 9.92/17.86
PIRE (T=500) 2.54/14.71 5.06/12.11
Gaussian Noise 10.68/14.71 8.27/9.93
each image query such that the result is a SSIM value similar to the
one caused by PIRE. (On average, for Oxford5k, SSIM equals 0.687
for PIRE, and 0.652 for Gaussian noise; for Paris6k, SSIM equals
0.716 for PIRE, and 0.708 for Gaussian noise.)
As shown in Table 8, Gaussian noise degrades performance in
the case of GIST-based CBIR. We assume that the reason is that
GIST extraction is based on spectral information, with which high-
frequency noise interferes, and that PIRE is having a similar effect.
More interesting is howPIRE degrades the performance of CEDD-
based CBIR. Our explanation for these results is that CEDD cap-
tures texture information, and that the structural perturbations
generated by PIRE interfere with texture more effectively than the
random changes of Gaussian noise. For completeness, we confirm
that this effect does not account for the ability of PIRE to block
neural-feature-based CBIR. In Table 2, we saw that PIRE (T = 500)
drops the mAP of a neural-based CBIR system from 74.42 to 2.31
for the Oxford5k data set (Whole Image queries). Here, the effect of
Gaussian noise contrasts with the effect of PIRE. If Gaussian Noise
instead of PIRE is used to modify the query, the drop is from 74.42
to only 71.45. Behavior on the Paris6k data set and with Bounding
Box queries is comparable.
7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper has made the case for studying adversarial queries in
content-based image retrieval. We have proposed a new algorithm
called PIRE, which is a neural perturbation approach for creating
adversarial queries. In contrast to previous work on adversarial
examples, PIRE does not require supervision (i.e., no labels from
the data set to which it is applied) and is for this reason suited for
image retrieval scenarios. Our experimental analysis of PIRE and
of other, more traditional, approaches for blocking image matching
with keypoint injection and removal (KR&I) has provided valuable
insight into adversarial queries. We summarize these insights in
terms of their implications for different groups of researchers.
Researchers in deep learning: Our paper opens interesting top-
ics in CBIR for researchers in deep learning. First, improvements
on PIRE can be explicitly designed to generate queries that are
adversarial with respect to a CBIR system for which little or no
information is available, i.e., that uses arbitrary neural representa-
tions. Next, we point out again that the data set used to fine-tune
our CNN-model is semantically related to the data set to which
PIRE is applied. Specifically, the fine-tuning data depicts buildings,
but not specifically in our cities. In the future, the impact of this
semantic relationship both on CBIR performance and on the ability
of PIRE to block CBIR performance should be better understood.
We also point to [18], work on universal perturbations for image
retrieval that came to our attention while preparing the camera-
ready version of this paper. Future work should further develop
the ideas of [18], such as universal perturbations (PIRE is image
specific) and pseudo-supervision.
Researchers interested in local and global features: Our experi-
mental analysis suggests that neural perturbations have potential
to block local-feature-based CBIR and global-feature-based CBIR,
opening interesting paths for future work. Our results with a neural-
feature-based CBIR system show that adversarial queries created
with neural perturbations lose their blocking ability after certain
edits. KR&I approaches may not have these weakness.
Multimedia privacy researchers: Not everyone who is able to de-
ploy CBIR on a large collection of users’ images can be expected
to have the users’ best interests in mind, and actors with ill intent
are an inevitable risk. Our results suggest that adversarial queries
are a promising topic of study for multimedia privacy researchers.
Note that modest reductions in CBIR performance may already
be enough to deincentivize malicious actors from abusing CBIR
systems. However, much research still lies ahead. In order to im-
plement privacy protection, it is necessary to apply modifications
not only to query images, but also to images in the background
collection. Our experimental results suggest that more work should
be devoted to understanding the rate at which image modifications
need to change dynamically in order to block CBIR over time. Fi-
nally, in order for users to adopt image modifications to protect
their privacy, it is necessary to pay close attention to the visual
acceptability of the modified images. Future work must focus both
on minimizing the visual impact of perturbations, as well as un-
derstanding how to make visual changes that are acceptable to the
user, in cases in which it is necessary to make visible changes.
In closing, we return to question in the paper’s title: ‘Who’s
afraid of adversarial queries?’ Depending on the threat model that
a researcher adopts, adversarial queries might be considered part of
the problem or part of the solution, and at first consideration might
be more or less scary. However, our overall answer is that no one
should be afraid of adversarial queries, since they are important to
understand and open up interesting new research questions.
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